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Introduction 
Each year, online fraud costs billions of dollars. In the UK, the National Fraud Authority’s 
annual fraud indicator estimated overall identified fraud losses for 2012/13 as £15.5 billion, 
with £9.1 billion experienced by individuals (£3.5 billion as a result of mass marketing fraud 
and £3.3 billion as a result of identity fraud) (NFA, 2013: 11). In the United States of 
America, the Internet Crime and Complaint Centre recorded reported online fraud losses of 
over $525 million in 2012 (IC3, 2013: 5). In Australia, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission’s annual report detailed over $93 million losses to scams in 2012 
(ACCC, 2013). These statistics point to substantial amounts of money lost by individuals 
every year as a result of online fraud. Given that online fraud and cybercrime have very low 
reporting rates (United Nations, 2013), it is likely that these figures are only a small 
indication of the true extent of monetary losses incurred. However, these figures also do not 
represent the associated costs of victimisation which extend past the financial losses, to 
include the physical and emotional health and wellbeing of victims and their families. In 
addition, many more losses are likely to be experienced by individuals who are unaware that 
they have been defrauded in some way (Cross et al., 2014).  
 
Online fraud can be defined as “the experience of an individual who has responded through 
the use of the internet to a dishonest invitation, request, notification or offer by providing 
personal information or money that has led to a financial or non-financial loss or impact of 
some kind” (Cross et al., 2014). While there are endless ways that a person can be 
approached, there are two prominent categories of online fraud relevant to the current 
paper: advanced fee fraud and romance fraud. Advanced fee fraud (AFF) is where a person 
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is asked to send a small amount of money with the promise of receiving a larger amount of 
money in the future, and is seen in the example of inheritance notifications, investment 
invitations, employment opportunities (Ross and Smith, 2011: 1). AFF can also be referred to 
as West African or Nigerian fraud, given its origins in Nigeria, or 419 fraud, given the section 
of the Nigerian Criminal Code that refers to this type of crime (Schoenmakers, de Vries and 
van Wijk, 2009). Romance fraud is similar to AFF, however it operates through the guise of a 
legitimate relationship between the offender/s and the victim (Rege, 2009). In these 
circumstances, offender/s will groom the victim into believing they are in a legitimate 
relationship and consequently, they will ask the victim to send money as the result of illness, 
criminal justice matters or travel costs. If the victim does this, the requests will continue and 
it will likely escalate into substantial financial losses. This type of fraud is particularly 
devastating as the victim not only suffers monetary losses, but also grieves the loss of the 
relationship (Whitty and Buchannan, 2012).  
 
It is difficult to ascertain an accurate picture on the prevalence of online fraud victimisation. 
As stated, online fraud has a very low reporting rate based on factors which include but are 
not limited to the shame and stigma associated with this type of victimisation, not knowing 
how or who to report the fraud to, and a lack of consistent definitions of what constitutes 
fraud (Button et al., 2014: 4). Despite this, there are a variety of estimates on the 
percentage of the population who are victims of fraud, though these assessments generally 
do not differentiate fraud which occurs in an offline or online context and encompass the a 
broader category of consumer fraud (which extends beyond AFF and other types of online 
fraud). Button and his colleagues (2014: 5) summarised a number of jurisdictional surveys 
on the prevalence of fraud. This asserted that in 2010-11, 6.7% of the Australian population 
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aged over 15 years has been the victim of at least one personal fraud in the past 12 months 
(2.9% scam related); that in the UK in 2012, 4.5% of plastic card holders has been a victim of 
fraud in the past 12 months; and in the USA in 2010, 24% of households had at least one 
person experience a fraud related crime in the past 12 months (all cited in Button et al., 
2014: 5). These statistics demonstrate the differences in how each jurisdiction 
conceptualises fraud and the variety witnessed in estimates of the overall population who 
have experienced fraud.  
 
In addition to the difficulties encountered in providing accurate estimates of the financial 
losses of online fraud and victimisation rates, online fraud poses a number of challenges to 
police in terms of being able to investigate, arrest and prosecute offenders, as witnessed in 
other crimes against the person or property crimes. While historically policing is a reactive 
profession, in recent decades this has shifted to include alternative approaches such as 
community policing models and more proactive approaches (Maguire, 2000). There is 
substantial evidence which demonstrates the ineffectiveness of reactive approaches on 
crime rates (Ratcliffe and Guidetti, 2008: 110). Consequently proactive approaches to crime 
control have emerged and there is a common understanding that proactive measures to 
prevent crime are preferential and offer greater benefits compared to the reactive 
strategies of arrest and prosecution (Sarre, 1995: 283). Financial and economic constraints 
placed on police agencies have also driven a shift to activities and policing strategies which 
are seen to be more effective in terms of resource allocation for police (Ratcliffe and 
Guidetti, 2008: 110).  
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It is well documented that fraud is not a priority for police organisations (Doig, et al., 2001; 
Levi, 2003; Frimpong and Baker, 2007; Button, 2010). Research within the UK context has 
continually documented the abolition of fraud squads (Doig and Levi, 2013: 148), the 
merging of fraud into other major crime units (which usually include homicide, robbery and 
drugs) (Levi, 2003: 41) or its inclusion in economic crime units (which incorporate measures 
to target organised crime, money laundering, corruption and the recovery of proceeds of 
crime) (Doig and Levi, 2013: 148). The difficulty with including fraud under the umbrella of 
these other crime units means that limited staff and resources are usually channelled to 
other investigations rather than concentrating on fraud matters (Doig et al., 2001; Button, 
2010).  
 
In addition, policing fraud in an online context can be problematic. This stems from the 
virtual nature of the criminal act, where it is difficult to identify an offence has occurred and 
investigate due to the largely transnational element of the crime and the complexity in 
following the money (Button, 2010: 290). Offenders exploit the jurisdictional boundaries 
which hamper law enforcement in their ability to investigate and prosecute. Often an 
offender in one country will target a victim in a second country and request money transfers 
to a third or even fourth country. Consequently, there are problems in identifying which 
police agency has jurisdiction over the matter and therefore who has responsibility to take 
action (Button, 2010: 290). Consequently, fraud receives comparatively little attention in 
contrast to more tangible crimes (such as street crimes) (Doig, et al., 2001). However, the 
lack of attention paid to online fraud is incongruent with the extent of the harm incurred by 
victims, with many victims experiencing a level of harm similar to that faced by victims of 
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violent crime, particularly in terms of emotional and psychological trauma (Marsh 2004: 
127; see also Deem 2000; Button et al. 2009; Deem et al., 2013). 
 
Project Sunbird is an example of how one police agency has recognised the importance of 
targeting online fraud and the need for a proactive police response. Project Sunbird is an 
example of a policing strategy aimed at reducing the amount of financial loss incurred by 
victims of online fraud. This paper examines the impetus for such an approach and the 
reasoning behind its use. It outlines five main benefits of this approach, which seek to 
counter many of the problems associated with policing fraud. Overall, this paper presents 
Project Sunbird as a positive strategy seeking to address online fraud victimisation, and 
which is argued to have the potential to greatly improve police responses to this particular 
crime type.  
 
Project Sunbird: An overview 
In May 2012, the West Australian Police (WAPOL) commenced Operation Sunbird, to 
investigate suspected fraudulent funds transfers between West Australians and West 
African nations (Department of Commerce, unpublished). Anecdotal evidence suggested it 
was a significant problem and likely the result of advanced fee fraud (AFF) approaches to 
victims. AFF approaches are characterised by an individual being asked to send a small 
amount of money up front in return for a promised larger amount of money (Ross and 
Smith, 2011). They can manifest themselves in an infinite number of guises such as business, 
investment, inheritance and romance opportunities (Ross and Smith, 2011; Cross et al., 
2014).  
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In 2010/11, the seriousness of fraud was highlighted through the illegitimate sale of two 
houses in Perth. In both cases, African-based offenders had assumed the identities of the 
property owners and had facilitated the sales through various means of online deception 
(Low and Griggs, 2011). While these incidents differ from traditional AFF, it served as a 
catalyst for police to take immediate action to prevent further victimisation to other home 
owners as well as restore confidence in the land title system.  
 
Prior to Project Sunbird, the West Australian Department of Commerce (Commerce) 
(through Consumer Protection’s ScamNet arm) routinely received inquiries from citizens 
seeking to verify the legitimacy of solicitations and to report monetary losses from online 
fraud. It became apparent that the prevention efforts undertaken by WAPOL had significant 
crossover with the work being undertaken by Commerce. Consequently, a formal 
partnership was established between WAPOL and Commerce, and Operation Sunbird was 
renamed Project Sunbird (Department of Commerce, unpublished).  
 
Project Sunbird is a multifaceted approach to identifying individuals who are sending money 
to selected “hot spot” West African countries identified by police as receiving high amounts 
of fraudulently obtained funds (at this stage being Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Sierra Leone and 
Togo). The project comprises five stages and responsibility for these is split between WAPOL 
and Commerce. The first stage is the identification of potential victims. This is conducted by 
WAPOL as a result of financial intelligence received to their staff of international money 
transfers to the five countries detailed above, but of which further details cannot be 
provided. A screening process is undertaken by WAPOL to exclude individuals who are not 
believed to be individual victims of fraud (for example, businesses and those believed to be 
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legitimately sending money to family). The screening process also assesses the risk to an 
individual should contact be made by police (i.e. potential for domestic violence) and/or an 
assessment as to whether the sender is knowingly involved in other criminal activity such as 
child exploitation or money laundering. WAPOL remove these individuals from the list and 
are left with a list of potential online fraud victims for on forwarding to Commerce.  
 
The second stage involves Commerce sending out an initial letter to the people on the list 
received from WAPOL. These individuals are targeted for direct intervention, through the 
sending of a letter acknowledging that the person is sending money to a West African 
country and outlines the circumstances which lead WAPOL/Commerce to believe the 
individual may be a victim of fraud. The letter encourages the individual to cease financial 
transactions and provides the recipient with contact details of Project Sunbird staff to 
discuss the matter further. The third stage focuses on the interruption of payments and 
funds transfers to the West African nations targeted. Primarily undertaken by Commerce, it 
involves working with money remittance agencies to block accounts of both potential 
victims and alleged offenders and also incorporates public warnings and education 
campaigns. The fourth stage is a combined effort between WAPOL and Commerce and 
involves the gathering of intelligence from the letter recipients, through their feedback to 
one or both agencies. This intelligence then feeds into the final stage of the project, being 
the investigation, which is led by WAPOL and can focus on local offenders if relevant, or 
make the appropriate referrals to overseas law enforcement where necessary.  
 
In addition to the letters, if a potential victim is identified as transferring large amounts of 
money in a short amount of time, or thought to be high risk (for example, through 
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information received from family members about plans to travel overseas to meet their 
alleged offender or their suspected involvement in money laundering), then WAPOL may 
initiate a home visit rather than a letter, where in a face-to-face situation police will outline 
the reasons why they believe the individual to be involved in fraud. A face-to-face meeting 
can also occur between potential victims and Commerce staff, through an invitation to 
attend the ScamNet offices in Perth. This personal contact between Project Sunbird staff 
and potential victims reiterates the seriousness of the situation and the priority that WAPOL 
and Commerce place on this crime problem.  
 
Prioritising online fraud: The Project Sunbird approach  
As previously outlined, research has established the low priority and lack of resources that 
have been afforded to fraud investigations, and the evolution of the internet in allowing 
offenders to perpetrate online based fraud has compounded this lack of policing attention. 
However, the approach taken by Project Sunbird attempts to address some of these 
difficulties, and puts forward an approach with the potential to improve overall policing 
responses to online fraud, for the benefit of both law enforcement agencies and victims. In 
particular, five main benefits have been identified, each of which will be now examined in 
detail.  
 
Gaining a more accurate picture of the problem 
It is well established that official crime statistics provide a picture of only a very small 
amount of all crime which occurs (Gorby, 2013: 394; Maguire, 2007). This is especially the 
case in terms of fraud, where there is ambiguity surrounding definitions of fraud (or 
financial crime) which hinders the ability of law enforcement to include these incidents in 
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official crime statistics (Levi, 2003; Gilligan, 2007). Even further, “many frauds are 
undiscovered and therefore hidden from official returns” (Button, et al., 2012: 66). Bowron 
and Shaw (2007: 6) affirm this in their assertion that fraud is an “under-reported, under-
recorded and under-resourced problem”.  
 
This extends to online fraud with currently one of the biggest challenges for police being the 
inability of victims to recognise their involvement in online fraud. Victims believe in the 
legitimacy of their circumstances and do not question why they are asked to continually 
send large amounts of money overseas. If an individual does not recognise their 
circumstance as fraud and does not think they are a victim, they will not report to police and 
it will remain hidden. However, even if a person does suspect online fraud, the shame and 
stigma associated with this type of crime victimisation presents a significant barrier in 
disclosing fraud to family, friends and law enforcement (Cross, 2013; Cross, forthcoming).   
 
In an attempt to overcome this, there has recently been a much greater effort by police 
agencies to monitor financial transactions and share intelligence and information in an 
effort to counter fraud. The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units facilitates sharing 
of financial intelligence across 130 countries globally, including Australia (Gilligan, 2007; 
Egmont Group, 2013). Several agencies in Australia have embraced the value of using 
financial intelligence to proactively combat online fraud, including WAPOL.  
 
Project Sunbird is an example of how financial intelligence can be used as a way of 
identifying suspected victims. It overcomes the need for individuals to recognise themselves 
as victims and report to police, as occurs with most other crime types. It also gives police a 
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more accurate picture of the money which is transferred as a result of suspected fraudulent 
transactions. For example, between January 2013 and May 2014, over $26 million was 
transferred from Western Australia to the five West African countries targeted (Project 
Sunbird data file, unpublished). Of this, Project Sunbird investigations suspect over $10 
million was transferred as the result of fraudulent activity (Project Sunbird data file, 
unpublished).  
 
In addition, Project Sunbird registers an incident report for all identified victims of online 
fraud on the WAPOL Incident Management System (IMS). By recording this as an official 
incident, Project Sunbird is able to create a more detailed and truthful depiction of the 
extent of online fraud and how it affects West Australian citizens. Given that many police 
agencies allocate budgets and resources on the basis of reported crime statistics (Gorby, 
2013: 393) this is an important step in allowing WAPOL to recognise the nature and extent 
of online fraud victimisation. It also helps justify the ongoing work of Project Sunbird. In an 
environment where police resources and budget allocations are driven by key performance 
indicators (Gorby, 2013), the recording of an incident on the IMS ensures the work of 
Project Sunbird staff is documented in a manner that is consistent with other WAPOL units 
and can also be subject to review and performance management. It also seeks to provide an 
evidence base to facilitate the allocation of police resources to more effectively target these 
individuals in an attempt to reduce monetary losses and overall victimisation. 
 
Reducing the impact and losses of online fraud 
The impact of online fraud on an individual can be devastating. It is not only the monetary 
losses incurred through sending money overseas, but studies indicate that the harm 
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suffered by victims extends to physical harm, emotional/psychological trauma, a sense of 
betrayal and relationship breakdown (Ganzini, et al., 1990; Titus et al., 1995; Deem, 2000; 
ASIC, 2002a; ASIC 2002b; Button et al., 2009a; Button et al., 2009b). In extreme cases, 
victims of online fraud have even resorted to self-harm or suicide (Cross et al., 2014).  
 
Through the active identification and contact with suspected fraud victims, Project Sunbird 
seeks to reduce the monetary losses incurred by these individuals and limit the impact of 
their victimisation. Since the commencement of sending letters in March 2013, Project 
Sunbird has mailed 1,969 first letters to potential victims. Of these individuals, financial 
intelligence indicates that approximately 66% of potential victims stop sending money after 
receipt of this first letter, and another 14% reduced the amount of money they sent 
overseas (Project Sunbird data file, unpublished). In order to determine this, transactions 
are monitored for individuals three months prior to Project Sunbird sending a letter and 
three months after the letter has been sent (excluding the month that the letter was 
despatched). However, not all letter recipients cease their financial transactions, many 
continue to send money and in some cases increase the amount. In response to this, 
Commerce sends a second letter which reiterates the belief that the recipient is likely to be 
involved in fraudulent activity. It also includes a “Help for Victims” factsheet designed to 
assist victims of fraud. Of those who receive a second letter, monitoring of transactions 
indicates that approximately 44% will cease payments after receipt of this second letter, and 
a further 33% will decrease the amount of money being transferred. Therefore in 
combination, it can be ascertained that a large number of individuals who are sent letters 
under Project Sunbird cease overseas payments in the months following receipt of either 
the first or second letter (Project Sunbird data file, unpublished).  
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It also appears that this may not be a temporary measure but may have an educative effect, 
with indications only four percent of victims who stopped payments in the three months 
following the first letter, restarted payments after their initial cessation (Project Sunbird 
data file, unpublished). However, what remains unknown is whether there is a displacement 
effect, whereby victims continue to send money to other countries not targeted by Project 
Sunbird, or if they cease transfers completely. A similar process for the monitoring of 
financial transactions to other countries is currently beyond the scope of Project Sunbird, 
and therefore the ongoing impact of this contact is unknown.  
 
Increasing the legitimacy of fraud victims  
Online fraud victimisation carries with it a strong sense of shame and embarrassment for 
the individual involved (Cross, 2013; Cross, forthcoming). There is a stigma associated with 
becoming a victim of this type of crime which acts as a large barrier to victims disclosing 
victimisation to family, friends or law enforcement, assuming they become aware of their 
circumstances (Cross, 2013; Cross, forthcoming). The identification of individuals 
transferring money to West African countries as potential victims is an important step in 
acknowledging online fraud as a legitimate crime problem. Project Sunbird recognises the 
suspected victims, and communicates this to the individual through the sending of letters 
and home visits. For some victims, this letter is the external confirmation needed to realise 
and acknowledge their involvement in fraud. For example, two victims contacted Project 
Sunbird staff after receiving the first letter, stating they were on the verge of suicide and 
may have attempted to take their own lives, had it not been for the contact they received 
from Project Sunbird (Eliot, 2012). The letter itself is an acknowledgement to the individual 
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of their situation and can validate their experiences as legitimate fraudulent victims. It 
provides an opening for recipients to contact Project Sunbird staff, knowing that they will be 
believed and listened to and gives the victims an outlet to express their suspicions or 
concerns in a safe and non-threatening manner.  
 
Improving the effectiveness of resource allocation for the police 
The proactive approach taken by Project Sunbird can be understood within the framework 
of proactive or intelligence led policing. Proactive policing can be defined as “making use of 
data to establish the existence and extent of a problem, to analyse its nature and source, to 
plan intervention measures to reduce it, and to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of 
the selected response” (Read and Tilley, 2000 cited in Clarke, 2006: 4). Each of these 
definitional elements is present in the Project Sunbird approach, with the financial 
intelligence used to identify suspected victims of online fraud who are sending money to 
West African countries. They are then contacted by Project Sunbird in an attempt to prevent 
further victimisation, which is subject to ongoing monitoring through financial intelligence. 
This approach sees limited police resources used in an effective manner to target the 
problem of online fraud.  
 
Intelligence led policing has been defined as “the application of criminal intelligence analysis 
as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention 
through effective policing strategies and external partnerships drawn from an evidential 
base” (Ratcliffe, 2003: 3). This definition highlights the importance of a partnership 
approach to online fraud, which is evident in Project Sunbird through the formal 
relationship established between WAPOL and Commerce. It has long been the belief that 
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police should not bear the sole responsibility for solving and preventing crime, rather police 
should work in partnership with other agencies and the community more broadly (Maguire, 
2000: 316). There has also been a call for police agencies to share information with other 
agencies in a more liberal way to facilitate crime reduction and prevention (Maguire, 2000: 
317; Doig and Levi, 2013: 147).  
 
As previously noted, Project Sunbird comprises five stages, with both agencies having clearly 
designated roles and functions across each stage. By collaborating with an agency such as 
Commerce, WAPOL are able to use the expertise and resources of this department to assist 
in the overall delivery of the project. It also allows WAPOL to focus specifically on the police 
aspects of the project, namely the identification of potential victims, the collating of 
intelligence received from victims, and the investigation of criminal matters. This is a benefit 
to both agencies.  
 
Improving police investigations and operations 
The intelligence gathered from victims of fraud contacted as part of Project Sunbird can also 
be used to assist WAPOL in the investigation of other crimes. In many cases, there are 
multiple victims sending money to one offender, and the identification of one victim can 
have a snowballing effect, and lead police to identify otherwise unknown victims. This can 
be achieved through monitoring the bank accounts and financial transactions of known 
offenders.  
 
To date, WAPOL have assisted other Australian and international law enforcement agencies 
to arrest those responsible for perpetrating online fraud. For example, these investigations 
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have led to the arrest of two alleged offenders in Nigeria for their involvement in romance 
fraud (West Australian Police, unpublished). For example, in 2013 three women from 
Western Australia had sent close to $300,000 in a six month period and additional 
transactions were identified from women in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria 
totalling just over $260,000 (West Australian Police, unpublished). Further to this, over 
$500,000 of transactions was linked to the same bank account as a result of this fraud (West 
Australian Police, unpublished). This case highlights the substantial amounts of money 
which are being solicited by offenders and the extent to which offenders will target multiple 
victims. It is a concrete example of how the intelligence gathered through Project Sunbird 
can locate additional victims, across multiple jurisdictions and can also lead to arrest of 
alleged offenders.  
 
In contrast to identifying further victims, the data gathered has also been used to assist in 
the investigation of other non-fraud related matters. For example, a teacher was accused of 
stealing money from the school they were employed at (West Australian Police, 
unpublished). When investigating officers searched the criminal database for this person, 
there was a note relating to Project Sunbird because this person was a victim of online fraud 
(West Australian Police, unpublished). This provided the motive for the stealing of money 
and police were not only able to deal with the offence, but also address the online fraud as 
the underlying cause for offending.  
 
Conclusion 
It is evident that online fraud poses a significant problem in terms of the number of victims 
and substantial amounts of money which are being transferred offshore. Traditionally, fraud 
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has not been seen as a priority for police agencies and consequently, the level of resources 
and staffing allocations have not allowed police to effectively police fraud. This has been 
compounded with the evolution of technology and the internet, which has increased the 
difficulties experienced by police agencies in attempting to address online fraud.  
 
This paper has put forward Project Sunbird as an example of a proactive policing approach 
which is targeting online fraud victimisation in Western Australia. Through their use of 
financial intelligence and established partnership with Commerce, WAPOL have been able 
to identify suspected victims of online fraud and intervene through the sending of a letter, 
with the aim of reducing the number of victims and quantum of money being sent to West 
Africa. It has examined the various barriers that have been experienced by police 
attempting to address online fraud, and detailed how the approach taken by Project Sunbird 
aims to achieve success through overcoming these obstacles. In particular, five benefits 
were identified, being a more accurate knowledge of the problem of online fraud; a 
reduction in the losses and impact to online fraud victims; an increase in the legitimacy of 
online fraud victims; an increase in effectiveness for police resources; and an improvement 
in police investigations and operations.  
 
In combination, these five arguments provide evidence of the positive impact that 
proactively using financial intelligence can have in responding to the problem of online 
fraud. However, while the initial results outlined are positive, further research is needed to 
establish the longer term impacts of this approach, to ascertain whether it can sustain the 
initial success which has been achieved and whether or not there are unintended 
consequences of this approach (such as the displacement of transfers to other countries). 
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Further analysis is also required examining the crime prevention aspects of this partnership 
in addition to its use as a policing strategy. Overall, this paper argues that Project Sunbird is 
an innovative and solid foundation on which to continue to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of policing approaches which seek to counter the problem of online fraud.  
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